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Comparative Civil Procedure and the
Style of Complex Contracts
John H. Langbein*
Among businessmen and lawyers familiar with commercial
practice in complex transactions on both sides of the Atlantic, it is a
common observation that a contract drafted in the United States is
typically vastly more detailed than a contract originating in Ger-
many or elsewhere on the Continent. My purpose in this paper is to
inquire into the causes of that notable difference in the style of
contracting.
The Belgian legal writer Georges van Hecke discussed this sub-
ject in a stimulating paper that is now a quarter-century old. He il-
lustrated the phenomenon with an anecdote. He told of a
transaction in which an American company and a European com-
pany were planning to affiliate by exchanging shares. The lawyers
for the American firm drafted two contracts to embrace the transac-
tion. The combined drafts ran about 10,000 words in length. The
European businessman had no prior experience with American law-
yers, and when presented with the elephantine American drafts he
was so shocked that he nearly renounced the deal. Thereupon it
was decided to start over, and the European businessman arranged
for his lawyer to prepare a counterdraft. "The result was a docu-
ment of 1400 words. It was found by the American party to include
all the substance that was really needed, and it was readily executed
by both parties and adequately performed."l
I. V AN HECKE'S ACCOUNT
Why are American contracts so much more detailed than Euro-
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1. Van Heeke, "A Civilian Looks at the Common-Law Lawyer," International
Contracts: Choice of Law and Language 5, 10 (Parker School of Foreign and Com-
parative Law, Columbia University, ed. 1962).
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pean?2 Van Hecke's article supplies a convenient starting point for
that inquiry. He offered three explanations.
1. Perfectionism. Van Hecke attributed to the American law-
yer a drive "for perfection that is not commonly to be found in Eu-
rope. The average American businessman is prepared to pay for this
perfection in the form of high fees," while his European counterpart
is not.3 But why? Why does "[t]he average European businessman"
seem to think "that a perfectly watertight contract cannot be
achieved and that it is not worthwhile to pay unreasonably high fees
for an objective that is not within reach"?4 To speak of differing
prospensities for perfectionism merely restates the problem, which
is to understand why the Americans strive for contractual terms
that are, in van Hecke's apt phrase, "perfectly watertight".
2. Federalism. Van Hecke directed attention to the multiplic-
ity of American jurisdictions. "An American lawyer, when drafting
a contract, does not know in what jurisdiction litigation will arise.
He must make a contract that will achieve its purpose in any Ameri-
can jurisdiction."5 By contrast, the European lawyer "always has in
mind the law of one country where the contract is being localized by
both choice of law and choice of forum."6
I think this argument is considerably overstated. European
states are comparatively small, and European deals must frequently
entail multistate dimensions. Further, the degree of diversity among
the American states in matters of contract and commercial law is
relatively slight-certainly less than among the states of Europe.
Although there are 50-odd American jurisdictions, all but Louisiana
and Puerto Rico have a law of contracts based on English common
law; and all except Louisiana now adhere to the Uniform Commer-
cial Code for commercial transactions.7
I do concede the point at which van Hecke hints when he
speaks of choice of law. The movements that have dominated
2. At some level the tension between "going short" and "going long"-between
capturing the essentials and enumerating the details-is endemic to legal drafting in
any legal system. Nor is the choice confined to styles of contracting; it can be seen in
statutory drafting as well. Contrast the gargantuan and pedantic Prussian civil code
of 1794 with the compressed and reticulated civil code (the BGB) that emerged on
the same soil a century later. Or notice the difference in aspiration between the
American antitrust statutes (the Sherman and Clayton acts) that "went short", on
the one hand, and the pension law (ERISA) that "went long". The point being as-
serted in text is not that Europeans always "go short," but that Americans are com-
paratively more disposed than Europeans to "go long".




7. National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws, 1985-1986
Reference Book 105 (1985). Louisiana has enacted portions of the U.C.C.
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American choice-of-Iaw thinking in recent decades have materially
impaired the predictability of our conflicts rules. Yet, if the spongi-
ness of American conflicts law were the factor driving American
lawyers to particularize the terms of complex contracts, we would
expect to see Americans drafting skimpier, more European-style
documents in real estate contracts, trust instruments, and other
fields where choice-of-Iaw problems are slight or can be easily
avoided. As a trust lawyer, I assure you that such is not the case.
Gargantuan, massively detailed instruments are a hallmark of rou-
tine trust drafting.
3. Code law versus case law. The most intriguing of van
Hecke's suggestions is that the different American style of con-
tracting is a manifestation of that seemingly profound difference be-
tween Continental and Anglo-American legal systems: The
European private law is codified whereas the American is not. Codi-
fication, especially in Germany and in the German-influenced legal
systems, entailed not only a reorganization of the law, but a scien-
tific recasting of legal concepts. "The European lawyer has at his
command a store of synthetic concepts, such as 'force majeure' [an
odd example, since equivalent notions exist in the common law].
Their exact meaning may not always be perfectly clear, but they do
save a lot of space-consuming enumeration."8 By contrast, American
lawyers draft to combat "the lawless science of their law, that code-
less myriad of precedent, that wilderness of single instances."9
Thus, van Hecke observes, "when a European and an American law-
yer want to express the same thing, an American lawyer needs far
more words."lO American contracts are prolix because American
substantive law is primitive.
The way to test this beguiling notion is to ask whether it fairly
describes what the American draftsman is doing with his boilerplate.
Is he really using his instrument to compensate for the lesser preci-
sion of his substantive law? Van Hecke supplies a single (and not
very typical) example of American boilerplate-he found it in a con-
tract and could not resist quoting it. The term read: "Except where
otherwise indicated by the context, singular terminology shall indi-
cate the plural and neuter terminology shall include the masculine
and feminine."ll Van Hecke then remarked dryly: "I do not know
in what American jurisdiction such a clause is considered to be nec-
essary...."12 The answer, of course, is that it is not necessary in any
8. Id.
9. Id. at 6, quoting, at n. 5, Lord Macmillan, who did not identify the source. It
is Tennyson, Aylmer's Field 146 (1894 ed.). lowe this reference to Rein Koetz.
10. Id. at 10.
11. Id.
12. Id.
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American jurisdiction, but neither do Continental codes contain
such drivel. Whatever may be the purpose of such a clause, it hardly
seems to have much to do with that "store of synthetic concepts"13
that distinguish the best codes.
I do not mean to deny the bearing that the gulf between case-
law and code-law legal cultures may have on the contrast between
American- and Continental-style contracting. I would agree to
reckon this difference in legal cultures as a predisposing factor.
American lawyers, reared in the case method, may indeed be more
sensitive to the nuances of factual detail than Continental lawyers,
whose training emphasizes doctrinal principles. Sometimes Ameri-
can boilerplate can be traced to a particular decided case, whose re-
sult the draftsman is trying to avoid. But comparative law long ago
recognized how much case law was being generated in the code sys-
tems, indeed, how strongly the forces of convergence were narrow-
ing the code law/case law contrast. Accordingly, it seems unrealistic
to attribute a practical difference as fundamental as the discrepancy
between American- and Continental-style contracting to that tired
contrast between code law and case law.
II. THE OBJECTS OF PROLIXITY
Broadly speaking, the provisions that lengthen most American
contracts serve either of two purposes.
1. Transaction-specific foresight clauses. Van Hecke ascribed
to perfectionism the American lawyer's effort to "handle all eventu-
alities in the contract rather than leave them to the decision of the
judge."14 Much of the detail in an American contract is tailored to
the particular transaction, and is designed to foresee ever more re-
mote contingencies. But human foresight has major limits, as any-
one who follows the stock market will attest. Today's price changes
reflect failures of foresight by half of yesterday's traders. Since it is
so intrinsically difficult to foresee future turns of events, the ques-
tion is why the Americans bother. Why should Americans be so
much more reluctant than Europeans to leave future events "to the
decision of the judge"?
2. Incorporating default rules. Even more curious than the
. striving of the American draftsman to foresee the unforeseeable is
his propensity for incorporating into a contract numerous well-set-
tled principles of law ("black letter rules") and canons of interpreta-
tion (such as van Hecke's illustration about construing number and
gender). To be sure, some boilerplate varies the subsidiary law, but
most boilerplate imposes rules whose applicability should be easily
13. Id.
14. Id. at 11.
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ascertainable if not instantly obvious. In current legal-academic par-
lance, these are "default rules"-the rules that would routinely ap-
ply if the contract had neglected to govern the matter. The puzzle
about American practice is to understand why, when the default
rules are obvious, the draftsman nevertheless wants to internalize
them in the instrument.
Notice that neither the foresight clauses nor the clauses incor-
porating default rules have much to do with the relative merits of
American and European substantive law. As regards foresight
clauses, the arguably superior Continental substantive law has no
advantage. The limits of foresight arise from the human condition;
European lawyers do no better at prophecy than American. The
question is why the Americans strain so much harder against the
limits of foresight. When, on the other hand, the contract is incorpo-
rating a default rule, the relative sophistication of the rule is beside
the point. The rule would govern, whatever its quality. The phe-
nomenon that needs explaining is why Americans put the rule in
the deal for the offchance that it is needed, rather than leave it on
the statute book or in the case law.
III. PROCEDURE AND PROCEDURAL INSTITUTIONS
I wish to offer a suggestion about the causes of American-style
contracting that points away from substantive law and toward proce-
dure. I locate the problem in another of the grand contrasts of com-
parative law: not code law versus case law, but in the gulf between
Continental and American civil procedure and procedural
institutions.
If you are a businessman (or the legal advisor to a businessman)
and you are contemplating a complex transaction, one of your deci-
sions is how much time, effort, and money you want to invest in con-
tracting precisely. To be sure, the clarity of the underlying
substantive law will strongly affect your decision, but as I have said,
there is little reason to think that American law is so consistently
and markedly underdeveloped by comparison with the law in all the
European states that differences in the quality of the substantive
law could explain the differing propensities of American and Euro-
pean businessmen to invest in contracting precisely.
Far more important, in my view, is your perception of the effi-
ciency and predictability of the procedural system through which
you would have to work in order to vindicate your substantive
rights. The point is not that most deals breed lawsuits-in truth few
do--but that, ex ante, every complex written contract contemplates
the risk of a lawsuit in the event of a breach. If the procedural sys-
tem that would process such a lawsuit is reasonably efficient, you
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will have less to fear from litigation than if it is not. For reasons
that I shall summarize below, American civil procedure is ineffi-
cient. It is expensive, protracted, and unpredictable, and it does a
poor job of discouraging frivolous suits (or frivolous defenses). The
European systems are markedly more efficient and more predictable
(some, to be sure, more so than others).
A businessman aware that his transaction would be subject to
litigation under the American system would have a materially
greater incentive to invest in contracting precision. His object would
be to prevent the lawsuit, by foreseeing the claim and stipulating
against it; or, should litigation nevertheless arise, to reduce the
range and complexity of the issues.
Consider, therefore, some of the most prominent shortcomings
of American civil procedure:
1. Who decides. Recall van Hecke's formulation of our prob-
lem: "[T]he American lawyer tries to handle all eventualities in the
contract rather than to leave them to the decision of the judge."15
Then recall who judges in American courts. The bench is composed
of politically selected (sometimes politically elected) ex-lawyers, as
opposed to the career magistrates who staff European courts. The
range of quality within the American judiciary is notoriously broad,
especially in the state courts that handle most commercial business.
The best American judges are splendid figures, but what must con-
cern a transaction planner is the risk that his contract will fall to a
judge drawn from the bottom of the American deck. A prudent
transaction planner assumes the reasonable worst case, and in the
United States in a matter of potential litigation that means reckon-
ing on a judge of the meanest ability and disposition.
Contrast in this regard the litigation prospects of the European
businessman. If his contract should give rise to litigation, the matter
will be decided by a trustworthy career judiciary whose members
have been selected and promoted on criteria of ability, learning, and
diligence. If the case cannot be clarified and resolved by settlement,
the first instance court decides the dispute by means of a written
judgment containing findings of fact and rulings of law.16
The conclusory general verdict of an American jury is, by con-
trast, the antithesis of a reasoned judgment; nor does American pro-
cedure require much better when the judge decides without a juryP
15. Id.
16. I have recently discussed these contrasts in Continental and American proce-
dure, court structure, and judicial staffing in Langbein, "The German Advantage in
Civil Procedure," 52 Univ. Chi. L. Rev. 823, 848-57 (1985).
17. I continue to speak of the reasonable worst case, which is the transaction
planner's standard. A particular lawsuit might fare better. In place of the general
verdict, the judge might allow a special verdict, in which the jury is asked "written
HeinOnline -- 35 Am. J. Comp. L. 387 1987
1987] LANGBEIN: COMPLEX CONTRACTS 387
The failure of American procedure to require effective disclosure of
the grounds of decision at first instance greatly hampers appellate
review.
The European transaction planner knows that if he is dissatis-
fied with the first-instance decision, he can obtain review de novo
(that is, full retrial on all issues of fact and law, with no presump-
tion of correctness attaching to the first-instance decision),18 The re-
viewing court will be composed of seasoned judges who have been
promoted to the appellate bench in recognition of the quality of
their performance in lower-court adjudication. Particularly in com-
mercial matters, it is common for European legal systems to employ
specialized courts or divisions, sometimes even at first-instance, and
routinely at the appellate leve1.l9 Thus, on the Continent, a complex
transaction that results in litigation will be decided by people who
are expert in the law governing such affairs-a notable contrast to
the amateurs who populate the American generalist judiciary.
And, of course, the grotesque amateurism of the American civil
jury system will not bedevil the European businessman. It is con-
ceivable that there is merit in having laymen adjudicate civil cases
that partake of ordinary experience; but no prudent businessman
would want to delegate to randomly selected laymen the power to
pass upon complex commercial and technological questions. Histori-
cally, the lawIfact distinction (reinforced by the reductionism of
common law pleading) limited jurors to deciding issues of "mere"
fact. In today's circumstances, however, issues of fact can be vastly
more difficult than those of law. If a legal system puts unsophistica-
ted laymen in charge of deciding issues of advanced finance and
technology, transaction planners will strain to avoid litigating in that
legal system.
2. Trial: adversary distortions. American procedure can func-
tion with a bench of uncertain quality in part because the judicial
role is narrower. In the American adversary system, the lawyers for
the parties gather evidence in advance of trial with virtually no judi-
cial involvement. The lawyers also dominate American trial proce-
questions susceptible of categorical [Le., yes or no] or other brief answer...." Fed-
eral Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 49(a) (1983 ed.). A special verdict is better than
a general verdict but hardly a substitute for the full and reasoned disclosure of an
experienced decisionmaker. In juryless cases the judge is supposed to make findings
of fact, e.g., id., Rule 52(a), but these findings are often perfunctory. See, e.g., Leub-
sdorf, "Constitutional Civil Procedure," 63 Tex. L. Rev. 579, 630 & n.311 (1984).
18. For comparative discussion, see Kaplan, von Mehren & Schaefer, "Phases of
German Civil Procedure," 71 Harv. L. Rev. 1193, 1443-54 (1958).
19. For the German scheme of specialized commercial chambers at first instance,
see Gerichtsverfassungsgesetz §§ 93-114. For an instructive comparative account of
the German specialized appellate chambers, see Meador, "Appellate Subject Matter
Organization: The German Design from an American Perspective," 5 Hastings Int'Z
& Compo L. Rev. 27 (1981).
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dure. Each side decides what evidence to present and in what
sequence. Continental procedure lacks the pretrial/trial distinction,
and the judge has the primary responsibility for eliciting the facts.
The truth-defeating excesses of American trial practice are well
known: coaching of witnesses, abusive cross-examination, and the
use of party-selected, litigation-biased experts.20 Civil procedure in a
system like the German quite effectively prevents these abuses. Be-
cause the lawyers are forbidden to have pretrial contact with non-
party witnesses, trial testimony is undistorted. The judge does most
of the examining of witnesses at trial, which largely eliminates par-
tisanship and trickery in examination and cross-examination. Per-
haps most important for the businessman concerned about the
possibility that a complex commercial transaction might give rise to
litigation, the German court has the help of neutral experts chosen
for their ability to assist the court in deciding correctly, rather than
(as in American practice) hirelings selected for their willingness to
reach preordained results favorable to the adversaries who hired
them.21
From the standpoint of the transaction planner, these truth-de-
feating excesses of American procedure all trend in the same direc-
tion: They reduce the predictability of litigation by increasing the
chance that adversary trickery will wrest an advantage over orderly
disclosure and consideration of relevant information.
3. Runaway pretrial. A corollary of the principle of the con-
centrated trial that dominates American civil procedure is that there
must be a separate pretrial process for the parties to gather the evi-
dence that they may need at trial.22 The judge customarily has little
contact with this pretrial investigation, although, especially in large
multi-party litigation, the prototype of strict judicial passivity is soft-
ening.23 The parties' lawyers employ the compulsory powers of the
discovery system largely without judicial supervision. They gather
documents from each other, and they create fresh evidence by pro-
pounding interrogatories and by deposing witnesses.
This system is immensely expensive and wasteful. It suffers
20. These themes are developed in Langbein, supra n. 16 at 833-41.
21. For discussion of the German practice, see id. at 835-41. French practice dif-
fers materially, but not in the critical respect that experts are capable and impartial.
See Beardsley, "Proof of Fact in French Civil Procedure," 34 Am. J. Compo L. 459,
484-85 (1986).
22. For an illuminating discussion of the central role of the principle of the con-
centrated trial in the Anglo-American procedural tradition, see von Mehren, "The
Significance for Procedural Practice and Theory of the Concentrated Trial: Compar-
ative Remarks," in 2 Europiiisches Rechtsdenken in Geschichte und Gegenwart:
Festschriftftir Helmut Coing 361-71 (Horn ed. 1982).
23. See, e.g., Resnik, "Managerial Judges," 96 Harv. L. Rev. 376 (1982). See gen-
erally, "Symposium on Litigation Management," 53 Univ. Chi. L. Rev. 305-560(1986).
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two fundamental flaws. It is intrinsically duplicative: Witnesses are
prepared, examined, and cross-examined during pretrial, then pre-
pared, examined, and cross-examined again at trial. But worse, the
want of judicial direction of pretrial all but guarantees that discov-
ery proceedings will be overbroad. In any legal system, a lawsuit
arising from a complex transaction can have many endings. Only
rarely can a litigator tell at the beginning precisely what issues and
what facts will prove important in the end. In a legal system such as
the German, the judge controls what issues will be investigated and
in what sequence. He limits the fact-gathering to the most promis-
ing issues-those most likely to clarify the case and hence to pro-
mote settlement or adjudication.24 Much of what could be
investigated does not have to be. By contrast, the American pre-
trial/trial division requires25 that discovery take place for the entire
case before the trier has the opportunity to signal what information
he thinks relevant to the decision. American lawyers thus strain to
investigate everything that could possibly arise at trial, because once
the trial commences there is no opportunity to go back and search
for further information.
The basic incentives of the American discovery system make for
waste and duplication. Discovery is the main activity of the Ameri-
can litigator. An experienced American transaction planner knows
that a central risk of having his contract enmeshed in litigation is
having to pay for so much legal makework.
4. Costs: subsidizing losers. Unique among the legal systems
of the world's advanced states, American civil procedure lacks the
general principle that the loser pays the winner's legal expenses.26
The world's most expensive legal system is also the least sensitive
about allocating the cost burden in a fair and rational manner.
While not all the ramifications of the American no-cost-shifting rule
trend in the same direction,27 the most important consequence of
the American rule is to encourage contumacy. In a loser-pays sys-
tem, the party with a bleak or hopeless case has a strong incentive to
24. For comparative discussion of the German practice see Langbein, supra n. 16
at 826-30.
25. Since 1980, phased discovery has been authorized under Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure, Rule 26(f), and some judges do exercise their authority to direct dis-
covery, especially in complex multi-party litigation. But the transaction planner has
no guarantee that his case will be handled by such a managerial judge; and if mana-
gerial judging mangles the pretrial, there is almost no appellate safeguard. See Res-
nik, supra n. 23 at 378, 380.
26. Recently canvassed in the Symposium, "Attorney Fee Shifting," 47 L. & Con-
temp.Prob. 1-354 (1984); see especially Pfennigstorf, "The European Experience with
Fee Shifting," id. at 37.
27. See Posner, Economic Analysis of Law 538-40 (3d ed. 1986); Shavell, "Suit,
Settlement, and Trial: A Theoretical Analysis under Alternative Methods for the
Allocation of Legal Costs," 11 J. Leg. Stud. 55 (1982).
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foresake or abandon litigation. Under the American rule, by con-
trast, litigating a losing case can be a strategic way of inflicting costs
on the other side. The American transaction planner knows that if
he has to litigate to enforce his deal, he cannot be made whole.
5. The planner's response. I have assembled this catalogue of pro-
cedural horrors with a view to showing why a rational businessman
should be terrified of having to litigate about a complex contract28
under the American civil procedural system. Unfortunately, it is
very hard to contract out of a procedural system entirely. Two con-
tracting parties located, say, in Pennsylvania would have a hard time
under the applicable choice-of-Iaw rule29 devising an enforceable
term that litigation arising under the contract should be processed
in Germany. Nor would they want to. There are enormous difficul-
ties and costs associated with litigating offshore: the inconvenience
and expense of a distant forum, the translations across language and
culture, the limits of foreign writ in such matters as compulsory pro-
cess and execution of judgment. Reasons such as these explain why,
even when an American firm engages in a transnational transaction
that could plausibly invoke foreign law and a foreign forum, the
American firm will often seek to impose American law. Conven-
ience and familiarity supply formidable economies.
The much-heralded growth of arbitration and of other modes of
alternative dispute resolution (ADR) in American commercial prac-
tice is, of course, consistent with the thesis I have been advancing in
this paper. ADR represents another kind of contractual response to
the defects of ordinary civil justice. Whereas contracting precision
aims to foresee the problems, ADR tries to avoid the courts. If any-
thing, the puzzle is to understand why Americans do not make
greater use of arbitration clauses than is now common. I sense that
the American lawyer does not fully trust arbitration agreements, at
least not enough to surrender his boilerplate. He may fear that the
court that adjudicates his contract will prove hostile to arbitration-
that the court will dust off the old theory that arbitration offends
28. Similar concerns about dysfunction in civil procedure and judicial adminis-
tration trouble the transaction planner who is trying to effect a gratuitous transfer,
for example, a will, and the response has been similar. In circumstances in which it
would be malpractice for an American lawyer to delete the usual boilerplate (i.e.,
provisions waiving bond, imposing personal representatives, minimizing judicial ap-
proval of accounts, preventing the guardianship of minors' property, and so forth), a
German lawyer might confidently recommend a will of a few sentences. See, e.g.,
the form for the so-called Berliner Testament in Beck'sches Formularbuch zum
Burgerlichen Handels- und Wirtschaftsrecht 643-44 (Hoffman-Becking & Schippel,
eds. 3d ed. 1984).
29. See, e.g., 1 American Law Institute, Restatement of the Law: Conflicts of
Law (Second) § 80, at 244-45 (1971).
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public policy because it ousts the jurisdiction of the courts;30 or that,
despite a good deal of contrary legislation and decisional law re-
stricting judicial review of arbitration awards, a reviewing court may
still find a way to subvert the award.31
Because it is so hard for the American transaction planner to es-
cape the shortcomings of his legal system, he is left to concentrate
on contracting precision for the purpose of narrowing his exposure
to the system. This motivation is clearest in those provisions that I
have called transaction-specific foresight clauses. To quote van
Heeke's formulation yet again, "the American lawyer tries to handle
all eventualities in the contract rather than leave them to the deci-
sion of the judge."32
The other great source of prolixity in American-style con-
tracting-general boilerplate incorporating the law that should ap-
ply even without the contractual term-is also to be explained by
fear of the litigation system. Why trust a judicial lightweight to find
his way in the law to the right rule when you can impose it on him
in the contract? Why should you risk a jury trial and its attendant
pretrial abuses over the question of whether you meant for some or-
dinary principle of commercial or legal common sense to apply?
The instinctive response is to spell it all out. Remember in this re-
gard that, unlike transaction-specific clauses,33 general boilerplate is
cheap to use. Formbooks collect the stuff, and businesses and law
firms tend to develop and carry forward their own sets of it. Boiler-
plate becomes habit-the mos Americanus.
30. For a recent example, see Wells v. Mobile County Board of Realtors, Inc.,
387 So.2d 140, 144-45 (Ala. 1980).
31. "[Clourts are requiring, to an increasing degree, not only that the entire arbi-
tration be fair but appear to be fair." Sweeney, "Judicial Review of Arbitral Pro-
ceedings," 5 Fordham Int'l. L. J. 253, 276 (1981-82)(emphasis original).
Arbitration is not the only plausible escape from the legal system. Because con-
tracting and vertical integration are alternative modes of arranging business, vertical
integration should be more attractive as contracting becomes less advantageous. Im-
plicitly, therefore, Americans should be more disposed to vertical integration than
the Europeans. But that proposition is hard to test, because so many other factors
bear on the levels of vertical integration.
32. Van Hecke, supra n. 1 at 11.
33. The smaller the deal, the more likely is the American lawyer to overcome
his instinct for contracting precision. The client will not pay $20,000 for legal serv-
ices to implement a $10,000 deal. American and Continental contracting styles di-
verge least in the realm of the small deal, for which an exchange of relatively simple
letters would be as nearly as routine on one side of the Atlantic as on the other.
An experienced American draftsman has remarked to me that he senses a dif-
ference in the predilection for contracting precision according to whether his client
is an independent entrepreneur or a large corporation. Corporate officers are more
likely to want to "cover themselves," to show superiors that the attempt was made
to "think of everything". .
Another wise practioner has mentioned to me the bureaucratic factor. In large
American law firms, many hands will touch a draft, and each draftsman wants to
make and preserve his own contribution.
HeinOnline -- 35 Am. J. Comp. L. 392 1987
392 THE AMERICAN JOURNAL OF COMPARATIVE LAW [Vol. 35
To be sure, the effort at greater precision in contracting is some-
times counterproductive. Detail is not synonymous with certainty.
Because the risks of ambiguity and of missed connections increase
with the complexity of an instrument, the draftsman may breed liti-
gation where he meant to prevent it. Alas, American practice seems
to show that the draftsman will respond by producing yet more boil-
erplate for the next contract, hoping for the future to cover the con-
tingency that surprised him the last time.
IV. WHITHER ENGLAND?
The astute van Hecke noticed an important point about Ameri-
can-style contracting: The English do not much practice it. "I heard
recently from a lawyer for an American enterprise engaged in busi-
ness in several European countries and in the United Kingdom," van
Hecke wrote. "He said that American drafts meet with about as
great resistance on account of their length, in England as on the
Continent."34 I, too, have heard such reports, from English and
American lawyers. In general, English-drafted contracts run longer
than European drafts but far shorter than American ones. Ameri-
can-style contracting is an Americanism, not an Anglo-Americanism.
In matters having to do with comparative civil procedure, we
expect to see England aligned with the United States. American
lawyers never tire of exulting in the ancient English heritage of
their legal system. American Bar Association politicians love to
deck themselves in the pomp of English judicial ritual. Indeed, the
president of the ABA shows up each fall at the ceremonial opening
of the English courts, where he gets to prance around with the er-
mine-clad and bewigged figures, seemingly from a distant age, who
lend a soothing dignity to the American lawyer's shoddy litigation
racket.
The question that naturally arises is this: Can we attribute
American-style contracting to the influence of the procedural sys-
tem when the English, who also practice adversary civil procedure,
do not share American contracting prolixity? The answer is
straightforward and instructive. Despite the shared precepts of the
adversary system, American and English procedure diverge sharply
in those fundamental respects in which American practice is so
alarming.
Although drawn from the bar and hence not career magistrates,
English judges are selected and promoted strictly on criteria of ju-
ridical merit.35 Civil jury trial for commercial transactions has been
34. Id.
35. See, e.g., Jackson, The Machinery ofJustice in England 469-70 (7th ed. 1977).
In "[t]he English system," write James and Hazard, "selection of judges [is made] by
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abolished.36 The trial judge adjudicates by means of a reasoned
opinion that discloses his findings of fact and rulings of law, thereby
enhancing the litigant's safeguard in appellate review. The English
pretrial discovery system is materially less adventurous than the
American,37 and users are subject to a cost sanction that-by charg-
ing the moving party for makework-helps deter abuse. Punitive
damages have been largely suppressed. Adversary distortion at trial
is more modulated. The barrister/solicitor division, although hardly
praiseworthy, does have the advantage of restraining pretrial coach-
ing of witnesses. Partisan experts are less mischievous when set
loose on an experienced and elite bench than when allowed to be-
guile jurors or hack judges. And perhaps most important, English
law applies the loser-pays cost-shifting norm, which greatly deters
nuisance litigation and promotes settlement.3s
Thus, what ails American civil procedure, and what American-
style contracting has arisen to avoid, is less the adversary principle
than the many mistakes Americans have made in implementing it.
V. BEYOND PROCEDURE
In emphasizing the shortcomings of American civil procedure
and procedural institutions as the primary explanation for Ameri-
can-style contracting, I do not mean to exclude other factors. In-
deed, I think a considerable list of such factors could be assembled.
There is, for example, no real American counterpart to the Conti-
nental general clauses. In Germany, § 242 of the BGB has been in-
terpreted as having written into every contract a judicially
supervisable requirement of good faith, far more wide-ranging than
the equivalent notions in the American Uniform Commercial Code.
Accordingly, the German contract draftsman may feel that he can-
not keep the courts out. Excessive detail may look like over-reach-
ing and invite judicial suspicion. I do not mean to convey any
particularly high regard for the expansive jurisprudence of § 242. I
share with John Dawson39 the American lawyer's suspicion that the
parties to a contract are likely to know more about the conventions
an essentially nonpolitical authority from among the trial bar (barristers) on the ba-
sis of professional assessment of merit as evidenced by experience in practice."
James & Hazard. Civil Procedure § 6.7, at 299 (3d ed. 1985). See also Shetreet,
Judges on Trial: A Study of the Appointment and Accountability of the English Ju-
diciary 46-84 (1976).
36. Jackson, supra n. 35 at 84-86, 498-500.
37. See generally, Levine, Discovery: A Comparison Between English and Amer-
ican Civil Discovery Laws with Reform Proposals (1982). For a capsule statement of
the differences, see id. at 8-9.
38. Jackson, supra n. 35 at 518-21.
39. See Dawson, "Judicial Revision of Frustrated Contracts: Germany," 63 Bos-
ton U. L. Rev. 1039, 1085-88, 1095-98 (1983).
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of their trade than a judge, even a German judge. My point is sim-
ply that if transaction planners understand that they cannot fore-
stall judicial oversight, they will not waste words trying.
American-style contracting is related to the broader use of law-
yers throughout American business. In areas as diverse as taxation,
regulatory compliance, and transaction planning, European business-
men are more likely than Americans to act without counseL Some
of this greater lawyerization of American life simply recapitulates
my theme (preventive law is the reaction to deficient legal proce-
dures and institutions), but the phenomenon is surely deeper.
Another suggestion that I find plausible although hardly cogent
is that cultural differences in the conduct of commercial affairs play
a role in American-style contracting. Business in the United States
has not been the preserve of the gentle elite. Commercial dealings
in Europe may have been conducted within a smaller and more so-
cially homogeneous group, and hence may have had more of the con-
siderate overtones that Americans think are confined to long-term
(that is, relational or repeat-player) contracts.
I have no doubt that a much longer list of such possibilities can
be assembled. I doubt, however, that anything on that list will ex-
plain as much about the difference in the style of complex contracts
as does comparative civil procedure.
